This paper models and estimates the gasoline price dispersion across time and space by introducing and using a unique gasoline price data set at the gas-station level within the U.S.. Nationwide e¤ects (measured by time …xed e¤ects or crude oil prices) explain up to about 51% of the gasoline price dispersion followed by the contributions of re…nery-speci…c costs up to about 33%, state taxes about 12%, markups through Bertrand competition about 10%, and spatial factors (such as local agglomeration externalities, land prices, distribution costs of gasoline) up to about 4%. The contribution of brand-speci…c factors are relatively minor. A welfare analysis further suggests that the elasticities of individual welfare with respect to gasoline prices vary signi…cantly across space, indicating redistributive welfare e¤ects of spatially distributed gasoline prices.
Introduction
Gasoline prices have signi…cant e¤ects on an economy, because higher oil prices can slow economic growth and a¤ect individual welfare in many ways. 1 As one example, gasoline prices have increased before any historical economic downturn in the U.S. (see Edelstein and Kilian, 2009 ). As another example, consider the survey reported by Bankrate.com in May 2012, which depicts that, from the end of December 2011 through mid-April 2012, the price of regular gas has risen from a national average of $3.30 per gallon to $3.94 (an increase about 19%), and, as a result, 59% of consumers have cut back on nonessential spending on things such as vacations and dining out, only because of gasoline price changes. These macroeconomic examples provide an average (nationwide) picture of the gasoline price e¤ects, but is the magnitude of these e¤ects the same across regions/individuals that have potentially di¤erent gasoline consumption patterns? The answer to this question is essential to understand the redistributive e¤ects of gasoline prices, especially when gasoline prices di¤er following a spatial pattern.
To better understand the magnitude of spatial gasoline price dispersion, consider a typical day between September 10th, 2010 and January 31st, 2011 when the retail-level gasoline price di¤erence between any two gas stations within the U.S. was as high as $2.25 (followed by $2.19) per gallon of regular gas. 2 If you think that this price dispersion was due to di¤erences in state-taxes per gallon, which ranged between 46.6 cents (for California) and 8 cents (for Alaska) in 2010 and between 49.6 cents (for Connecticut) and 8 cents (in Alaska) in 2011, you are only partially right, because, for a typical day of the very same sample period, the price di¤erence between any two gas stations within any given state/district of the U.S. was as high as $1.57 (for Washington D.C. on October 15th, 2010)
followed by $0.99 (for Iowa for October 10th, 2010). 3 Therefore, a detailed spatial analysis is required the …rst paper introducing and using these data. The daily gasoline price data set involves brand information of gas stations as well as their location information at the exact address level. Combining this data set with the exact (address-level) location information of oil re…neries, state-level taxes, crude oil prices, land prices (at the zip-code level), and a spatial measure of gasoline demand (namely, the distribution of nighttime lights data across space), we decompose the e¤ects of crude oil prices, re…nery costs, distribution costs, brand-speci…c costs, state taxes, land prices, local agglomeration externalities (i.e., spatial demand and number of competitors), and gas-station level markups on the retail gasoline prices through a spatial analysis that models and estimates the transportation needs of individuals, strategic pricing behavior of gas stations (through Bertrand competition), and distribution of gasoline from re…neries to gas stations. The crude oil prices (or any other time-varying e¤ect that is common across gas stations) are supposed to capture the e¤ects of nationwide factors on the gasoline prices, while other variables included in the analysis are supposed to capture the spatial factors.
For the sample period mentioned above, the variance decomposition of gasoline prices across time and space suggests that the highest contribution is by time …xed e¤ects (or crude oil prices) capturing up to 51% (or 39%) of the price dispersion (i.e., nationwide e¤ects are almost half of the overall e¤ects), followed by re…nery-speci…c costs capturing up to 33% of the price dispersion, state taxes capturing up to 12% of price dispersion, and spatial factors (such as local agglomeration externalities, land prices, distribution costs of gasoline) capturing up to 4% of price dispersion. Despite expectations (arising mostly due to the existing literature), the contribution of brand-speci…c costs are relatively minor. On
top of that, we analyze the contribution of markups and show that about an additional 10% of the gasoline price dispersion can be explained by Bertrand competition under the case of spatially-varying elasticity of substitution between gasoline and other consumption goods. Furthermore, when individual welfare e¤ects are investigated, the elasticity of welfare with respect to gasoline prices have been found to be ranging between 4:89 and 5:26 suggesting that even if the gas prices would go up by 1% (e.g., an increase about 3 cents when gasoline prices are $3), individual welfare can change (increase or decrease)
as much as about 5%, depending on the spatial location of the individual, which is an indicator for redistributive welfare e¤ects of the spatial distribution of gasoline prices.
gasoline price dispersion within the U.S. is due to changes in the price of crude oil; and (ii) across-state variation in prices can be attributed to demand variation, as well as di¤erences in taxes, environmental regulations and market power. In addition to such studies, this paper attempts to explain the spatial gasoline price di¤erences within states.
Literature Review
This paper is connected to the empirical literature analyzing the determinants of gasoline price dispersion at the gas station level. The literature has focused on price control variables such as (i) local demographics or station location (LDSL), (ii) brand or contractual arrangements (BCA), (iii) station density or local concentration (SDLC), and (iv) physical station characteristics (PSC). 5 We review a part of the literature in detail that we see as most relevant to this paper in chronological order, below.
Shepard (1993) has used cross-sectional gasoline price data collected over a twelve week period in the …rst quarter of 1987 from over 1,100 gas stations from Eastern Massachusetts. Shepard has
shown that prices across stations vary with BCA (i.e., contractual form between re…ners and stations),
with SDLC (i.e., number, proximity and characteristics of competing retailers), with PSC (i.e., station characteristics such as selling non-gasoline products or services), but prices do not vary with LDSL (i.e., market conditions such as tra¢ c volume).
Ning and Haining (2003) have used gasoline price data collected over eight biweekly period in mostly the …rst quarter of 1995 from 113 gas stations, together with price data collected over six weekly period in mostly the …rst quarter of 1997 from 96 gas stations, from She¢ eld, England. They have shown that SDLC and PSC (e.g., spatial competition, being attached to a supermarket) are statistically signi…cant, but LDSL (e.g., number of cars around the gas station, percentage of higher income households in the neighborhood of a station) are not statistically signi…cant.
Van Meerbeeck (2003) has used gasoline price data covering 477 gas stations in Belgium on a daily basis between 1998 and 2001. This data set includes only two brands of gasoline (Shell and TotalFina).
Van Meerbeeck has observed that prices vary with LDSL (i.e., stations located along a highway always charge the maximum price determined by an agreement between the oil industry and the Belgian government), somehow with SDLC (i.e., prices are below the maximum price in markets with su¢ cient competition and that the number of local competitors does not have a large impact on retail gasoline prices). Barron et al. (2004) have used cross-sectional gasoline price data covering 3,197 gas stations in four metropolitan areas (Phoenix, AZ, Tuscon, AZ San Diego, CA, and San Francisco, CA) for only one day in 1997 (where that one day di¤ers across metropolitan areas). They have found that an increase in station density (SDLC) consistently decreases both price levels and price dispersion across four geographical areas. They have also found that price vary with BCA (i.e., brand identi…ers) and 5 See Eckert (2011) for a survey of empirical studies of gasoline retailing.
PSC (i.e., a variable indicating whether the primary image of the station is a convenience store or a repair station, a variable indicating whether full-service gasoline is sold at the station, and a variable re ‡ecting the number of fueling positions). Compared to the literature mentioned so far, this paper uses the most comprehensive gasoline price data: an unbalanced daily panel over 144 days from 38,245 gas stations from all around the U.S. In addition to the literature, we have found that re…ner …xed e¤ects are also econometrically signi…cant in explaining gasoline prices. 6 Furthermore, considering gasoline price dispersion at the gas-station level across time and space within the U.S., we show that time …xed e¤ects (capturing crude oil price changes as well as other time-varying costs common across gas stations) contribute most, followed in descending order of magnitude by LDSL (i.e., the sum of the e¤ects of re…nery costs due to the station location, spatial demand, and land prices), legislative e¤ects (i.e., state-level taxes), SDLC (i.e., number of competitors or Bertrand competition) and BCA (i.e., brand identities).
The Economic Environment
We introduce an economic environment to model the details of (i) the retail chain in the U.S. gasoline market (to the degree that our data allow us), (ii) price-setting behavior of gas stations through
Bertrand competition, and (iii) the spatial distribution of economic activity among individuals. The model is used not only to provide a simple basis for our estimation but also to investigate the redistribution of welfare among individuals due to the spatial distribution of gasoline prices. Considering the available data, having such a modeling strategy results in a reduced-form estimation of gas-station level gasoline prices together with investigating how gas stations compete with each other. Although having a reduced-form estimation may seem like a restrictive approach, it is in fact very useful in terms of comparing/decomposing the contribution of many input costs and markups (both determined spatially)
to the gasoline price dispersion at the gas-station level.
Regarding the retain chain in the U.S. gasoline market, at least 90% of the gasoline sold at retaillevel gas stations is produced by re…ning crude oil (because up to 10% of the retail-level gasoline may be ethanol in the U.S.). The gasoline produced at the re…nery is then either directly transported to gas stations by truck or to local distribution/bulk terminals by pipeline, barge or rail. In the latter case, local distribution terminals add some additives such as ethanol or brand-speci…c ingredients (e.g.,
Chevron including Techron into its gasoline) and sell the …nal version of gasoline to retail-level gas stations where transportation is mostly achieved by trucks. Studies such as Borenstein et al. (1997) and Kleit (2005) have depicted more details about the gasoline production and distribution within the U.S.
Within this picture, since (i) our primary data set is for retail gasoline prices at the gas station level, (ii) our secondary data set is for the location of re…neries, and (iii) we do not have any data on distribution terminals, to keep the analysis as simple as possible, in this paper, we only model the production of gasoline at the re…neries and the distribution of gasoline from re…neries to the gas stations; i.e., we skip modeling local distribution terminals and include the possible injection of additives in the production function of gas stations. Accordingly, as in Chouinard and Perlo¤ (2007) or Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) , we assume that each gas station purchases gasoline from the nearest re…ner.
We model the gasoline demand of individuals/producers in a spatial context. A typical individual s (at location s) produces a particular amount of good s to sell; this is the only source of income for individual s. Individual s consumes gasoline and other goods purchased from other individuals around her. The transportation needs of individual s also depends on the distribution of economic activity around her; e.g., a dispersed city like Miami, FL may require more transportation than a compact city like San Francisco, CA.
Spatially distributed gas stations maximize their pro…ts based on the gasoline demand of individuals, the cost of gasoline (charged by nearest re…ners), and other spatial factors. Optimization implies that the price of gasoline at a particular gas station depends on spatial economic factors (such as the size and the distribution of economic activity around the gas station, the distance of the gas station to the re…nery, number of other gas stations in the vicinity), the cost of gasoline at the re…nery (re ‡ecting the changes in oil prices), legislative factors (such as state-level taxes), local competition, and brand-speci…c costs/bene…ts.
Although the model is mostly static in technical terms, the time dimension comes into picture through state-level taxes, land prices, gas-station markups, and time-varying crude oil prices. To keep the notation simple, we will skip the time dimension until the end of this section.
Individuals
The unique individual s at location s 2 S representing the latitude and longitude intervals, has the utility given by:
where C s is an aggregate index of consumption and !Y s is the disutility due to producing Y s amount of good s. Consumption of goods is combined with usage of gasoline that is assumed to depend on the spatial distribution of economic activity around individual s; hence, C s is de…ned as:
where Q s is an aggregate index of goods, G s is the consumption of gasoline, and D s represents the spatial distribution of economic activity around individual/location s. Therefore, individual s has a higher preference toward gasoline (i.e., a higher value of D s ) if she is living in a neighborhood with a more dispersed economic activity. 7 Individual s maximizes her utility subject to her budget constraint:
where P s is the price of C s , and s s is the price of good s charged by its producer individual s. Utility maximization, together with using the budget constraint, results in the following expression for the 7 This modeling approach considers distance-related costs in an indirect way through the spatial distribution of economic activity. An alternative approach may be to consider the distance-related disutility of individuals from going to any gas station in a direct way. However, there is no empirical evidence in the literature for such a consideration; moreover, we do not have any data (that match individuals with gas stations) that can be used to test the implications in such a case. In sum, we believe that we have the best available modeling approach given the data and empirical evidence in the literature. amount of good s produced:
The optimal allocation of expenditure yields the following demand functions for Q s and G s :
and
where s and R s are the prices of Q s and G s , respectively. It is implied that P s is connected to s and R s as follows:
Individual s can satisfy her aggregate gasoline demand of G s from di¤erent gas stations around her through a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregator:
where g 2 S s represents the set of gas stations around individual s, G g s is the gasoline demand of individual s at gas station g (which is around individual/location s), > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between gas stations, and N s is the number of gas stations around individual/location s. The optimal allocation of gasoline expenditure yields the following demand function of individual s at gas station g:
where X s = (P s ) s C s is a measure of the size/scale of economic activity of individual s, and R g is the retail price of gasoline (per gallon) at gas station g that satis…es:
8 This is also the expression one can get with a modeling strategy which endows each individual with 1 ! unit of product.
Gas Stations
Since we do not model local distribution terminals, we include the possible injection of additives (e.g.,
Chevron injecting Techron into its gasoline) in the production function of gas stations. In particular, gas station g of brand b located at location g produces Y g gallons of gas according to:
where K g is the amount of gasoline purchased from the nearest re…nery, B g is the brand-speci…c additives included into the gasoline, H g is the land, and A g is the productivity which is assumed to be subject to local agglomeration/Marshallian externalities:
where f G g represents the size and spatial distribution of economic activity around gas station g, f N g is the number of gas stations around gas station g, and and (1 ) are the parameters governing the strength of production externalities. 9 The gas station chooses K g taking the price set by the nearest re…nery as given. The cost minimization results in the following marginal cost of production:
where W r is the price of gasoline charged by the nearest re…nery r, g r represents transport cost of gasoline from the nearest re…nery r to gas station g, b g is the price of brand-speci…c ingredients/additives, and h g is the price of land. On top of the marginal cost of production, gas station g also pays (net) gasoline taxes of t g . Considering such additional costs, gas station g sets its price by maximizing its pro…t of:
subject to the demand for gasoline at gas station g.
We need to match individuals with gas stations in order to calculate the demand for gasoline at gas station g. Accordingly, we will model individuals purchasing gasoline from gas stations around them.
Although "around them" is an uncertain concept, we will de…ne it in detail and provide alternative measures for it during the data section, below. For now, we will simply consider that any individual s around gas station g will have a demand for gasoline at gas station g given by Equation 3.8. The number of individuals, however, will change with respect to the spatial measure of location considered.
As a result, the total demand for gasoline at gas station g coming from all individuals around it is given by:
where s 2 S g represents the set of individuals around gas station g. Substituting this expression into the market clearing condition, we have Y g = P s2Sg G g s , which implies that the optimal retail price of gasoline for gas station g can be obtained as:
where M g is already given in Equation 3.10, and g is the gross markup determined through Bertrand competition.
Bertrand Competition
In Bertrand competition, each gas station takes the price of other gas stations around it as given for its pro…t maximization problem and …nds its best response function. Accordingly, gas station g has the following gross markup expression in Bertrand competition:
Although we will use the exact expression of Equation 3.12 in our investigation, to give the reader a comparison point, in a special case in which s = for all s, the gross markup is a function of the elasticity of substitution across gas stations:
which is the gross markup expression in a typical monopolistic competition framework with CES preferences.
During the empirical analysis, below, we will also impose equal long-run equilibrium pro…ts across gas stations. Such an imposition will not only help us estimate using the available data, together with the implications of the model, but also correspond to the same implications as in having gas stations selecting their own locations (i.e., gas stations cannot get better o¤ in terms of their pro…ts by moving to another location). Although we accept the location of gas stations given in our empirical investigation, we assume that the location-selection problem of gas stations has already been achieved in an upper-level optimization, which is not the focus of this paper. With the available data in hand, empirically testing the location-selection problem of gas stations is not feasible anyways; therefore, we will only consider the pro…t implications across gas stations in our sample during the empirical analysis, below.
Re…ners
Re…ner r produces Y r units of gasoline according to a linear production function:
where O r is the amount of crude oil used as an input. The re…nery chooses O r taking its price as given.
The cost minimization results in the following marginal cost of production:
where W o is the price of crude oil at the oil …eld, o r represents net transport costs of crude oil from the oil …eld to the re…nery, and T represents subsidies/transfers received. Since we do not have any price data for re…ners, rather than complicating the model with unnecessary details, we simply assume that the re…ner sets its price equal to its marginal cost:
As in the case of gas stations, although we accept the location of re…ners given in our empirical investigation, we assume that the location-selection problem of re…ners has already been achieved in an upper-level optimization (that has resulted in a zero-pro…t condition under the simple assumption of free entry).
Closing the Model
For simplicity, we close the model by assuming that (i) gas stations and land are owned by re…ners with equal shares among them (although they are managed independently so that they have their own optimization problems), and (ii) tax revenues are used to subsidize re…ners. Accordingly, gas station 10 In the empirical analysis below, we will use re…ner …xed e¤ects to capture any other detail (that is common through time) of the gasoline prices charged by re…ners that have not been modeled here.
pro…ts, tax revenues, and land income are transferred to all re…ners through T in Equation 3.14, where T , which is common across re…ners, is chosen in such a way that the total amount of subsidies/transfers is equal to the total amount of gas station pro…ts, tax revenues, and land income for each time period.
Time Dimension
The time dimension of the model comes from the price of crude oil W o (which is an input for the re…ner), taxes t g (which can be di¤erent between legislative years), land prices h g (subject to changes due to local markets that we do not model), gas station markups g (determined on a daily basis, since marginal costs may change every day), elasticity of substitution between gasoline and other goods , and transfers to re…ners T (capturing time-varying gas station pro…ts, tax revenues, and land income). Accordingly, using Equations 3.10 and 3.15, the gasoline price expression for gas station g (i.e., Equation 3.11) can be rewritten as follows, this time with the time dimension:
This is the …rst expression that we empirically test, below, where f G g and f N g are assumed to be constant over time.
Similarly, the markup expression with the time dimension is given by: (3.17) This is the second expression that we will empirically test, below, where D s , X s , and N s are assumed to be constant over time.
Data
The details of the data required to estimate the log version of 3.16 are depicted in this section.
Data for Prices
We collected the regular gasoline prices per gallon R g t covering 50 states of the U.S., together with District of Columbia, from www.gasbuddy.com on a daily basis between September 10th, 2010 and January 31st, 2011 (i.e., for 144 days). GasBuddy.com is a network of web sites in the United States that operates under many local domain names such as MiamiGasPrices.com or NewYorkGasPrices.com.
Individuals post the gasoline prices that they have seen around them to these web sites; in return, they earn points that can be used to enter ra-es for prizes such as $250 gas cards. Atkinson (2008) has cross checked the validity of the price data collected from GasBuddy.com by using other independent gasoline price data and concluded that the data obtained from GasBuddy.com can in fact be used to examine spatial price competition, both within and across markets.
We downloaded the data at around 8pm each and every day during the sample period. This is the …rst paper introducing and using this data set. These are regular gasoline prices at the gas station level where the location information is as good as the actual address of the gas station in the U.S. 11 The brand of the gas station is also available (which we use to create brand …xed e¤ects to measure b g s 's in the regression analysis, below). A typical gasoline price observation that we have is a price of $2.73 on October 15th, 2010 from the gas station brand of "Murphy USA" located at "8922 N Terre Haute Rd, Paris, IL". Since the data on the web page have been submitted by actual individuals, there were some problems, such as typos in the addresses, or digit errors made while typing the prices. For the former, we have …ltered the data by matching the addresses with the Google Map addresses; when they matched (i.e., when the actual address could be found by Google Map with an accuracy of 7, 8 or 9, where 9 is the best level of accuracy at the exact location name and address level, 8 is the accuracy at the address level, and 7 is the accuracy at the level of intersection of roads according to the standards of the Google Map system), we kept the price observation and further obtained the latitude and longitude, together with zip codes (which we use to match the gasoline price data with land prices, below), of each and every gas station in our sample. For the latter, we …ltered the price data by ignoring the price observations that are at least two times higher or lower than the average gas prices for a speci…c day. After such a data cleaning process, we ended up with 469,408 (i.e., close to half a million) price observations. These gasoline price observations belong to 38,245 di¤erent gas stations; hence, on average, we have about 12 days of gasoline price observation per gas station. The spatial distribution of gas stations can also be found on a map of the U.S. in Figure 1 .
The descriptive statistics of the gasoline price data are given in Table 1 where details at the statelevel are provided for presentational purposes; these are the numbers providing the motivation of this paper. The left panel of Table 1 The middle panel of Table 1 provides further information on the price dispersion across states. In particular, the maximum gasoline price di¤erence between any two gas stations is calculated for each state and for each day as follows:
Then, across time, the other statistics are calculated according to state ! R g t ; e.g., the column min for any state is calculated by …nding the minimum value of state ! R g t across t. Therefore, the maximum price di¤erence for a typical state in a typical day was as high as $1.57 (for Washington D.C.) and as low as $0 (for Alaska). The standard deviation (across time) of the maximum price di¤erence was as high as 0.60 (for Hawaii) and as low as 0.09 (for New Hampshire). In sum, according to Table 1 , there were high levels of gasoline price dispersion, even within states/districts, during the sample period.
Data for Economic Activity and Spatial Measures
In order to capture the part of the local agglomeration externalities through f G g in Equation 3 .16 (that have negative e¤ects on gas-station-level gasoline prices), since we have a spatial analysis of gasoline prices, we need corresponding spatial data for the size and spatial distribution of economic activity around gas station g. Accordingly, we will use the standard deviation of the nighttime lights around gas station g as a proxy for f
where g represents the standard deviation of nighttime lights (across space) around gas station g. It is important to emphasize that standard deviation is a measure that can capture both the size/scale and the distribution of nighttime lights 12 ; hence, it is a perfect match to capture the expected negative e¤ects of f G g . Our motivation comes out of many studies that have shown the almost-perfect correlation between economic activity and nighttime lights (e.g., see Croft, 1978 . However, this is the …rst paper we are aware of that uses the spatial distribution of nighttime lights data to measure the spatial distribution of economic activity. The average (rather than standard deviation of) nighttime lights would de…nitely be a measure of economic activity, but it cannot capture the spatial distribution of economic activity; we rather save the average measure of nighttime lights to measure the economic activity of individuals and for a robustness analysis, below, where we will use it as an alternative proxy for the number of gas stations.
In order to capture the size of economic activity of individual s, X s , in Equation 3.17, we will use the nighttime light of location s (i.e., the location of individual s) as a proxy:
where n s is the nighttime light of location s. Alternatively, a numerical solution for X s can be found using the to-be-introduced microfoundations of our model regarding the economic interaction among individuals and gasoline prices at the gas-station level; we will achieve such a solution in the welfare analysis section, below. As a robustness check, a comparison of the two measures of X s will follow the welfare analysis.
Similarly, in order to capture the spatial distribution of economic activity around individual s, D s , in Equation 3.17, we will use the coe¢ cient of variation (de…ned as standard deviation over mean) of the nighttime lights around individual s as a proxy:
where s represents the standard deviation and m s represents the average nighttime lights (across space) around individual s.
In technical terms, the nighttime lights are measured for each 30-arc-second grids, spanning 65 to the U.S.; therefore, these 30-arc-second grids are natural minimum measures in our analysis to create di¤erent spatial location concepts. Accordingly, to connect the data to the model, we assume that each 30-arc-second grid is occupied by a potential individual, say, individual s in the model. In Figure 2 , In the model, it is the individuals who travel for economic activity and purchase gasoline. Although we match each 30-arc-second grid with a potential individual, we also need to match the travel patterns of individuals with spatial measures of locations to identify the phrases that we have been using so far, "around individual s" and "around gas station g". Accordingly, the spatial location measures we will consider in the empirical analysis will be to capture the travel patterns of individuals. For example, if we would use only one 30-arc-second grid as our spatial measure, "around individual s" or "around gas station g" would correspond to 25 square blocks (or 0.25 square miles) in the U.S. on average, and if we would use hundred 30-arc-second grids as our spatial measure, they would correspond to 2; 500(= 50 50) square blocks (or 25 square miles) in the U.S. on average. When "around individual s" and "around gas station g" intersect with each other on the map, it means that individual s has a demand for gasoline at gas station g given by Equation 3.8; hence, the gas stations located within the travel patterns of individuals are potential suppliers of gasoline.
In formal terms, we consider …ve di¤erent measures of spatial location.
Spatial Measure #1: Since we compute the spatial distribution of economic activity by the coe¢ cient of variation of nighttime lights across 30-arc-second grids in Equation 4.1, we need nighttime light data from several grids in order to obtain a standard deviation measure. So, to …nd the intersection of "around individual s" and "around gas station g" on the map, for each gas station g, after …nding the 30-arc-second grid at which gas station g is located (by matching the latitude and longitude of the gas station with the same information from the nighttime lights data), we consider 5 additional 30-arcsecond grids (about 2.5 miles) to the north, south, west, and east of the gas station's grid. This would correspond to a space consisting of 121 30-arc-second grids around gas station g. Figure 3 may further help to visualize the spatial measure that we consider. Since the length of a side of a 30-arc-second grid is about 0.5 miles, Figure 3 corresponds to a spatial measure of about 30 square miles around gas station g that is located at the center of the …gure. Since the spatial measure we use applies to both individuals and gas stations, every 30-arc-second grid in Figure 3 represents potential customers of gas station g.
It is also important to emphasize that we have the nighttime light data for every 30-arc-second grid in Figure 3 ; hence, we have enough number of observations (121 of them) to calculate the standard deviation of nighttime lights g across these grids. One may be curious about why we have considered a spatial measure up to about 10,100 square miles around the gas station. Our motivation comes from the National Household Travel Survey (for the year of 2009) that has collected data on both long-distance and local travel by the American public.
Spatial
According to this survey, on average, an individual has traveled (one-way) about 36 miles per day, and an individual has driven (one-way) about 29 miles per day. Since an individual has the option to purchase gasoline from any location on her (one-way) route, considering spatial measures up to 10,100 square miles (i.e., one-way routes up to 50 miles) around the gas station just covers the demand patterns of a typical gasoline consumer in the U.S.
The nighttime lights data have been obtained from the web page of the National Geophysical Data
Center. 13 The data set is the part of "Version 4 DMSP-OLS Nighttime Lights Time Series" for 2010.
Within this data set, we use two di¤erent measures of nighttime lights: (i) Average Visible, Stable
Lights, and Cloud Free Coverages; and (ii) The nighttime lights product known as "avg_lights_x_pct" which is derived from the average visible band digital number of cloud-free light detections multiplied by the percent frequency of light detection. 14 The empirical results that we will depict have been obtained by using the latter; but, the results were almost exactly the same when we used the former.
Data for Number of Gas Stations
In order to capture the part of the local agglomeration externalities through f N g in Equation 3 .16 (that have negative e¤ects on gas-station-level gasoline prices), we have calculated the number of gas stations f N g around gas station g (in Equation 3.16) as the number of gas stations for which we have price data at least once during our sample period of 144 days. The number of gas stations for each state/district (for the pooled sample through time) is given in the …rst column of Table 1 where the numbers range we calculated the number of gas stations f N g in our sample (by using their latitudes and longitudes from Google Map) depending on our di¤erent spatial measures, above. Therefore, compared to the existing literature, we focus on more than one spatial measure to calculate the number of station.
We are well aware that that f N g (i.e., number of gas stations for which we have price data at least once during our sample period of 144 days) may not be capturing the actual number of gas stations around gas station g; hence, as an alternative, in the robustness/regression analysis, we also used the 13 The nighttime light …les are cloud-free composites made using all the available archived DMSP-OLS smooth resolution data for the calendar year of 2010. 14 In the latter, the inclusion of the percent frequency of detection term normalizes the resulting digital values for variations in the persistence of lighting. For instance, the value for a light only detected half the time is discounted by 50%. Note that this product contains detections from …res and a variable amount of background noise. This is the product used to infer gas ‡aring volumes from the nighttime lights.
average nighttime lights m g around gas station g as a proxy for f N g because of the trivial conjecture that the number of gas stations is correlated with the economic activity around gas station g.
Data for Re…ners
Since we haven't modeled the petroleum bulk stations and distribution terminals (for simplicity, because of the lack of available location data for such stations/terminals, and because of the lack of data on possible contracts between terminals and gas stations), we assumed that gas stations purchase gasoline from the nearest re…nery as in Chouinard and Perlo¤ (2007) 
where is the elasticity of distance to capture the relation between distance and gasoline transportation costs. The spatial distribution of re…ners can also be found on a map of the U.S. in Figure 1 where there are 143 re…ners from the U.S. and 4 re…ners from Canada; Canadian re…ners are the nearest re…ners to some gas stations (in our sample) in Northeastern United States. Note that we will also use re…nery …xed e¤ects in the regression analysis, below, so that possible border e¤ects (if any) caused by purchasing gasoline from Canadian re…ners will be captured by such …xed e¤ects.
Data for Land Prices
The land prices (h g t 's in Equation 3.16) were proxied by the Zillow Home Value Index (ZHVI) at the zip-code level. These monthly data have been obtained from www.zillow.com for the sample period of the gasoline price data. We believe that ZHVI is one of the best available proxies for land prices because of its spatial coverage (e.g., Zillow appraises about 75% of the houses in the U.S. several times a week and aggregates these house-level valuations into indexes at the ZIP code level). 15 To match the data with the model, we used the following expression:
where h g t2m is the land price faced by gas station g at day t that belongs to month m (e.g., September, 2010), and ZHV I m is the Zillow Home Value Index for month m. In other words, the time dimension of land prices are due to changes in monthly home prices.
Data for Taxes
Since we have the address of each and every gas station, it was trivial to identify the state in which the gas station operates and to obtain gasoline taxes at the state level from www.taxfoundation.org for both 2010 and 2011. The state-level taxes per gallon of gasoline are given in the right panel of Table 1 However, the obtained gasoline taxes (at both state and federal levels) are in additive (rather than multiplicative) terms. Hence, to connect the data to our model (where taxes are in multiplicative terms), we have to use a transformation of taxes from additive to multiplicative form. Accordingly, for state-level taxes, we used the following transformation for any gas station: are the tax rates faced by gas station g at time t that belongs to year y.
An alternative would be to subtract the summation of state-level and federal additive taxes from the retail gasoline prices at the gas station level and conduct the empirical analysis without taxes;
however, in such a case, it would not be possible to have a variance decomposition analysis to show the contribution of taxes to the gasoline price dispersion, since such an analysis requires linearity (either in logs or levels) to be tractable.
Data for Crude Oil Prices
We will use time …xed e¤ects to capture the e¤ects of daily crude oil prices in the regression analysis, below. Although we have a rough justi…cation through our model that (1 T t ) captures time-varying subsidies/transfers to re…ners, the empirical reason for using time …xed e¤ects rather than using the actual crude oil prices is that crude oil prices may be re ‡ected by gas stations after a certain period of time. For example, Borenstein et al. (1997) show that one cent of an increase in crude oil prices leads to an increase of 0.55 cents in gasoline prices in the …rst two weeks and further 0.12 cent increase in the next two weeks, and for a 0.67 cents increase after four weeks; moreover, the response of retail gasoline prices may be di¤erent between an increase and a decrease in crude oil prices or the transmission of shocks from crude oil prices to gasoline prices can be a¤ected di¤erently by supply and demand factors as in Kilian (2010) . Since the focus of this paper is the spatial analysis of gasoline prices, we simply ignore the dynamic transmission mechanism of crude oil price changes into the retail-level gasoline prices and use time …xed e¤ects to capture daily crude oil prices. Nevertheless, for robustness, we will use daily crude oil prices of West Texas Intermediate obtained from www.eia.gov to compare the estimated time …xed e¤ects with daily crude oil prices, below.
Empirical Analysis
This section depicts the estimation methodology, details of the variance decomposition analysis, and empirical results.
Estimation Methodology
We follow a two-step estimation methodology to deal with the complications due to Bertrand competition. 16 In the …rst step, we estimate the log version of Equation 3.16 combined with data de…nitions given in Equations 4.1, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6, which is given by: 
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Residuals which can be estimated using time …xed e¤ects to measure the time-varying costs of log (W o t (1 T t )), re…nery …xed e¤ects to measure log transport costs of crude oil from the oil …eld to the re…nery log (1 + o r ), log distance to the re…nery log (d g r ) to measure transportation costs of gasoline from the re…nery to the gas station, log standard deviation of nighttime lights log ( g ) to measure the size and spatial distribution of economic activity around gas station g, log number of gas stations log f N g around gas station g, brand …xed e¤ects to measure brand-speci…c costs log (b g ), time-varying log Zillow Home Value Index at the zip-code level to measure land prices log (h ; the unexplained part (i.e., residuals) will be assumed to represent log gas-station speci…c markups log g t (to be consistent with the model) at time t. Since state and federal taxes have a coe¢ cient of one in front of them, we will use restricted least squares for the estimation.
In the second step, we further investigate the …tted residuals of the …rst step log where " g t is the part of residuals from the …rst-step regression that is unexplained by Bertrand competition. However, we need to know the values of (to calculate R s 's and the overall right hand side of the expression) and s;t (to calculate the right hand side of the expression). We will use the implication of our model to estimate after imposing equal pro…ts across gas stations that serve to same individuals (which is a weaker assumption compared to the assumption of zero pro…ts). Equal pro…ts imply that the ratio of total demand for two gas stations, g and m, is given by:
which can be rewritten in log form using Equations 3.8 and 3.11 that:
where can be estimated using the ratio of …tted residuals of the …rst step (to create the left hand side variable) and the ratio of gasoline prices across gas stations (to create the right hand side variable).
Since there is no constant term on the right hand side, as in Eaton and Kortum (2002), among others, we will use method of moments estimator (i.e., the mean of the left hand side variable over the mean of the right hand side variable) to estimate . After knowing , we will estimate s;t through a grid search (for each s; t) that explains Equation 5.2 best. Although this grid search will force s;t 's to match the residuals of the …rst-step analysis, the overall analysis will be consistent with the model; hence, we will be pushing the model to match the gasoline price data. Nevertheless, since we will use the implications of the model for a welfare analysis, below, we need a version of the model that is consistent with the available data anyway, which we will achieve according to this approach.
One possible concern regarding the estimation of Equation 5.1 may be endogeneity. Nevertheless, it is easy to show that this should not be a concern when we take our model literally by considering the economic intuition (coming from optimization of individuals and gas stations) behind Equations 5.1 and 5.2. In particular, an endogeneity problem would arise if markups (or its determinants) given by production-side details of the gas station. More speci…cally, (i) the …xed e¤ects already take care of some of the possible endogeneity problems due to having panel data (i.e., they are rather cures rather than creating problems); (ii) distance to re…nery d g r , which is assumed to be determined by re…ners during their unmodeled location-selection problem through having a cost-bene…t analysis considering a much wider (rather than local in the scale of gas stations and/or …rms) spatial optimization, is …xed/given for any gas station or the individuals around that gas station; (iii) the standard deviation of nighttime lights g around the gas station g are not correlated with either the nighttime light X s of the exact location of individuals around the gas station or the coe¢ cient of variation of nighttime lights D s around these individuals; (iv) number of gas stations f N g around gas station g is not necessarily correlated with the number of gas stations N s around individuals (around the gas station), since gas stations and individuals have their own spaces (although they overlap up to some degree) according to the model;
we, nevertheless, consider an alternative measure of f N g , the average nighttime lights, in our robustness analysis, below, after which the results are virtually the same; (v) the land prices h 
Variance Decomposition Analysis
Although the regression analysis depicts how the gasoline prices change with right hand side (RHS) variables, it cannot explain the contribution of each RHS variable on the variance of gasoline prices across gas stations, which is a natural measure of gasoline price dispersion. Note that the variance decomposition analysis also depicts the percentage of total sum of squares explained by each RHS variable;
i.e., it decomposes the contribution of each RHS variable on the R-squared measure. Accordingly, using the estimated parameters and the …tted values coming from the …rst-step analysis, we will conduct a variance decomposition analysis where we will further investigate the role of each explanatory variable on the variance of gasoline prices across gas stations as follows: 17 It is important to emphasize that we also considered using formal endogeneity tests (i.e., Hausman speci…cation error test with the modi…cation suggested by Pindyck-Rubinfeld), however, since markups are given in a nonlinear form, we faced several convergence problems during the simultaneous estimation of gasoline prices and markups, mostly due to the size of our data set. Nevertheless, even the existence of markups would lead to endogeneity, our results would not be a¤ected under the special case of s = , which implies constant markups as given in Equation 3.13. ; log R g t
where var is the operator of variance and cov is the operator of covariance.
We will also conduct a secondary variance decomposition analysis, this time for the second-step estimation, where we will consider the contribution of Bertrand competition to markups. In particular, we will use: 
Empirical Results
The results of the …rst-step regression are given in Table 2 Although an R-squared value of 0.90 is a high measure of …t, we need to know the contribution of each RHS variable on this value. Accordingly, we depict the variance decomposition of log gasoline prices (across time and space) in Table 3 where the percentage contribution of each RHS variable is depicted for di¤erent spatial measures. As is evident, the highest contribution to the gasoline price dispersion of about 51% is by time …xed e¤ects, followed by re…nery …xed e¤ects contributing up to 33%, state taxes contributing about 12%, spatial demand contributing up to 2%, land prices contributing up to about 1.4%, the number of local competitors contributing up to 0.3%, and distribution costs contributing up to 0.1%. The contribution of brand …xed e¤ects on the gasoline price dispersion, however, is very minor, ranging between 0:5% and 0:1% that can be considered as a smoothing e¤ect of discount gasoline stations. Since additive federal taxes were common across all gas stations, their multiplicative version has another smoothing e¤ect on gasoline price dispersion; federal taxes reduce gasoline price dispersion by more than 7%.
The remaining (about 10% of) gasoline price dispersion is unexplained by the …rst-step regression analysis. When this unexplained part is further investigated by the second step analysis of Bertrand competition, the results are given in top panel of Table 4 . As is evident, the estimates for the elasticity of substitution across gas stations obtained by Equation 5.4 range between 3.55 and 3.62; they are stable across di¤erent spatial measures. The median estimate for the elasticity of substitution between gasoline and other goods s;t ranges between 16.8 and 26.9, where the median has been calculated across time t and space s. When these estimates of and s;t are used, the correlation between two sides of Equation 5.2 is almost perfect for any spatial measure. The corresponding variance decomposition analyses further suggest (after rounding) that virtually all of the …rst-step residuals (i.e., about 10% of gasoline price dispersion) can be explained by the second-step analysis of Bertrand competition. These results are not surprising at all, since we are pushing s;t 's to match our data; therefore, s;t 's are employed as residuals in our analysis. Nevertheless, this approach allows us to identify the conditions (i.e., s;t estimates) under which Bertrand competition explains our gasoline price data best.
Overall, since time …xed e¤ects can be thought as nationwide e¤ects (because they capture any e¤ect common across all gas stations within the U.S.), we can claim that about half of the gasoline price dispersion (across time and space) is due to nationwide e¤ects, and the remaining half is due to spatial factors.
Discussion and Robustness
This section questions the RHS variables that have been included in the regression analysis, provides alternative RHS measures for robustness, and discusses the empirical results through comparisons with the existing literature.
Although the model implies that we should be including all the RHS variables in the regression analysis, is their inclusion statistically signi…cant? In order to answer this question, for each spatial measure, we used several F-tests to compare the full version of the model with its restricted versions where we excluded one set of RHS variables (e.g., spatial gasoline demand, brand …xed e¤ects or time …xed e¤ects) at a time. Under the null hypothesis that the restrictions are valid, the F-test results suggested that p values are virtually equal to zero; hence, all restrictions were rejected, or the full version of the model was accepted as the correct version of the model.
According to the empirical results, the gasoline price dispersion is mostly determined by time …xed e¤ects. Although they have been included in the analysis to capture the e¤ects of crude oil prices, they may be capturing any other time varying e¤ect that is common across all gas stations as well (e.g., weekend, weekday, or before-holiday pricing strategies). When we compared estimated time …xed e¤ects of the …rst-step analysis with daily crude oil prices, we obtained a correlation coe¢ cient of about 0.87 (for all …ve spatial measures that we considered); hence, time …xed e¤ects in fact mostly capture crude oil prices during the sample period. The di¤erence between time …xed e¤ects and crude oil prices can mostly be attributable to the transmission of crude oil prices to retail-level gasoline prices (or daily pricing strategies) as we discussed above. Nevertheless, for robustness, we had an alternative two-step analysis where we replaced time …xed e¤ects with crude oil prices. In such a case, the contribution of crude oil prices to the gasoline price dispersion (through our variance decomposition analysis) has been estimated as about 38% or 39% (depending on the spatial measure considered) where the di¤erence between the contribution of time …xed e¤ects (about 51%) and crude oil prices has shown up in the residuals (of which contribution increased from about 10% to about 22%). 18 Therefore, replacing time …xed e¤ects with crude oil prices does not alter the result that the main contribution to the overall gasoline price dispersion during our sample period is by crude oil prices. This result is somehow consistent with
Chouinard and Perlo¤ (2007) who show using a panel of monthly observations at the state level for the 1989-1997 period that almost the entire variation in national gasoline prices is due to a rise in the price of crude oil and that across-state variation can be attributed to demand variation, as well as di¤erences in taxes. We also show that di¤erences in spatial demand and taxes are important in explaining gasoline price dispersion, however, in addition to Chouinard and Perlo¤ (2007), we have shown that re…nery …xed e¤ects also have signi…cant e¤ects (e.g., about 1/3 of the gasoline price dispersion is due to re…nery …xed e¤ects).
Compared to the studies focusing on gas-station level gasoline prices (that we discussed during the literature review, above), showing the contribution of re…nery …xed e¤ects to the gasoline price dispersion is the main nuance of this paper. The main reason for other papers ignoring such e¤ects were either due to the lack of a comprehensive data set and/or the lack of modeling such e¤ects. Nevertheless, the high contribution of re…nery …xed e¤ects in this paper can be connected to studies for other countries at more aggregated levels such as the one by Sen (2003) who shows using a panel data set of monthly city-level prices for 11 Canadian cities over the 1991-1997 period that wholesale prices (captured by re…nery …xed e¤ects in this paper) play a larger role in retail price determination than city level market structure (captured by spatial demand or land prices in this paper).
Since the number of gas stations around gas station g measured by f N g in our gasoline price data set may not be capturing the actual number of gas stations, as an alternative, we used the average nighttime lights m s to proxy for f N g as discussed, above. The revised two-step analysis suggested that although the average nighttime lights a have negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient estimate (obtained by the alternative …rst-step analysis), its contribution to the gasoline price dispersion is still at most about 1.5% (obtained by the alternative second-step analysis after considering all spatial measures).
Moreover, although their coe¢ cient estimates were found to be signi…cant in the …rst-step analysis, the contributions of brand …xed e¤ects and spatial demand to the gasoline price dispersion were found to be minor (in both benchmark and alternative analyses) as well. However, recall that the studies focusing on gas-station level gasoline prices (mentioned above) have mostly emphasized the e¤ects of the brand of gasoline (measured by brand …xed e¤ects in this paper), spatial gasoline demand, and local competition on the gasoline price dispersion. One reason for this di¤erence may be the focus on local or small markets by such other studies, because, by focusing on the overall U.S. market, this paper can capture the big picture of the gasoline market. To be more speci…c, consider a special case of our model where we would focus on a very local market for a speci…c day where all gas stations purchase gasoline from the very same re…nery. In such a case, gas stations would have very similar gasoline prices with each other, because they would be subject to very similar time …xed e¤ects, re…nery …xed e¤ects, state taxes, land prices, and gasoline distribution costs; for sure, the only remaining factors to capture the price dispersion between these local gas stations would then be the brand …xed e¤ects, spatial demand, and local competition. Therefore, focusing on the overall U.S. market is in fact the key here.
Although studies such as Barron et al. (2004) emphasize homogenous nature of gasoline and state 'gasoline markets appear to be nearly ideal for testing the theories because the physical attributes of regular unleaded gasoline are essentially identical across spatially di¤erentiated sellers', we have modeled the preferences of individuals at any location s in space with a CES function aggregated using an elasticity of substitution ; through our two-step estimation process, we also estimated , so, in a way,
we tested the assumption of homogeneity in our analysis. The value of the elasticity of substitution (between gas stations at any given location s) estimated by the second-step analysis is about 3.6 which is mostly an indicator of monopolistically competitive local markets rather than a more competitive market (with a higher value) capturing the homogenous nature of gasoline. 19 However, recall that we have estimated by using the implication of our model after assuming that the pro…ts are equalized across gas stations. In order to see the contribution of this assumption, we had a robustness check by setting = 10 and replicated our second-step analysis accordingly. In such a case, the obtained s;t values through our grid search were lower by taking a median value of around 9:9 for Spatial Measure #1 (compared to the median value of around 16.8 for Spatial Measure #1 in Table 4 ), suggesting that when a higher value of is considered, s;t estimates adjust to match the data by having lower values.
Nevertheless, we will stand behind our and s;t estimates (for di¤erent spatial measures) in Table 4 and use them in the welfare analysis, below, because they are consistent with our model/data compared to ad hoc measures.
Due to the lack of available data, our analysis is not without caveats, though. the model of this paper has not considered gas station characteristics, such as whether the station has a car wash or repair service, it accepts credit card payments, it o¤ers full service (rather than self service), 19 Related empirical studies such as Houde (2009) etc. Again due to the lack of available data, we could not consider the e¤ects of distribution/bulk terminals or contractual forms between re…ners, terminals, and stations, either. Therefore, such details may well be a¤ecting the values of spatially-varying price elasticities of demand for gasoline, s;t 's, obtained through our two-step analysis where we literally take the implications of our model.
Welfare Analysis
We .3, the only di¤erence across individual utilities is due to C s , which we will accept as our measure of welfare. We will assume that migration across space (which would lead to the equalization of utilities across individuals) can be achieved only in the long run; hence, in the short-run, the location of individuals is …xed. Accordingly, we will focus on such short-run welfare e¤ects which can have di¤erent magnitudes based on the location of each individual. By using the welfare measure of C s , for each individual s, we will calculate the elasticity of welfare with respect to gasoline prices around her for a typical day, November 29th, 2010, which has experienced the highest variation (measured by standard deviation) of gasoline prices across gas stations within the U.S. in our sample. 20 We start with obtaining an expression for C s using Equations 3.2 and 3.3 as follows:
which can be used to calculate the elasticity of welfare with respect to gasoline prices when information is available regarding s s and P s . This requires modeling the economic interaction between individuals. Accordingly, aggregate index of goods Q s (for any individual s) is given by:
where j 2 S s represents the set of individuals/producers that are around individual s, Z s is the number of individuals/producers around individual s, and Q j s is the quantity of good j consumed by individual 20 This spatial analysis can easily be replicated for any day in our sample using the Matlab codes to be published;
however, since we are working with 30-arc-second grids in our investigation, analyzing the whole sample period would be very time consuming. As evidence, investigating only one day (as in this section) has taken about a week for Spatial
Measure #1 and about two weeks for Spatial Measure #2.
s. The optimal allocation of expenditure yields the following demand function for Q It is important to emphasize that, although source prices ( j j 's) are the same across individuals, the price index s is di¤erent for each individual s, because it consists of the good prices around individual s (represented by j 2 S s in the aggregation).
The market clearing condition for any good s is given by:
which can be combined with the symmetric version of Equation 7.2 to obtain:
Substituting Equations 3.3, 3.6, 3.4, and 7.3 into this expression results in: 
where we have used Equations 3.6 and 7.3. Since we are interested in the elasticity of welfare with respect to gasoline prices and we have a numerical solution for Elasticity of Welfare = log c C s log C s (7.6) which is in fact a measure of the elasticity of welfare with respect to gasoline prices, since the change in gasoline prices is already one percent. 22 In terms of connecting the welfare analysis to the model and data, since each individual s is located at a 30-arc-second grid of the nighttime light data (in order to connect the model with data, as above), using the implications of the model, we can calculate the elasticity given by Equation 7.6 for each 30-arc-second grid that we have nighttime lights and gasoline data for. In such a case, we will need measures of R s , D s , Z s and s for all s, as mentioned above. An expression for R s is already given by Equation 3.9 which is a function of gasoline prices R g at the gas-station level around individual s (for which we have data), the number of gas stations N s around individual s (for which we have data), and the elasticity of substitution across gas stations (that we estimated during the second-step of our empirical analysis, above). An expression for the spatial distribution of economic activity D s is given by Equation 4.3, which is a function of the standard deviation s and the average m s of nighttime lights around individual s, and the parameter capturing the relation between nighttime lights and economic activity; note that can be identi…ed using the estimates of coe¢ cients in front of log ( g ) and log f N g in the …rst-step empirical analysis, The number of individuals/producers Z s around individual s is set equal to the number of 30-arc-second grids for which nighttime light data are available. Finally, we estimated s for each individual/location s during the second-step of our empirical analysis, above.
Using this approach, we can calculate the elasticity of welfare with respect to gasoline prices given by Equation 7.6 for each 30-arc-second grid that we have nighttime lights and gasoline data for. 23 We 21 One percent increase in gasoline prices has been calculated in log terms, which implies that one-percent increased gasoline prices at the gas-station level c R 22 Notice that ! drops in this expression, since it is a constant; hence, its value is not important in our analysis. 23 Since we are considering each and every 30-arc-second grid on the U.S. map, this analysis is computationally time consuming. Nevertheless, such an analysis is necessary to depict the spatial distribution of welfare e¤ects due to gasoline price changes. 
where we can use the very same variables and parameters, as above. When values of the two alternative expressions for X s are compared across all 30-arc-second grids, as is evident in Table 5 , the median correlation coe¢ cient between them is calculated as 0.43 and 0.34 for Spatial Measures #1 and #2, respectively, which is another robustness indicator in our analysis.
Conclusion
Using a unique comprehensive gasoline price data at the gas-station level, this paper has achieved a spatial analysis to explain the determinants of the gasoline prices and their dispersion across space and time within the U.S.. The results suggest that about half of the gasoline price dispersion (across time and space) is due to nationwide e¤ects, and the remaining half is due to spatial factors. The change in gasoline prices through time is mostly explained by crude oil prices, and the spatial gasoline price dispersion is mostly explained by re…nery …xed e¤ects followed by state-level taxes and markup di¤erences.
Compared to the existing literature that emphasize the role of gasoline brands and local density of stations on gasoline prices, we have shown that the contribution of such e¤ects are relatively minor after controlling for other/spatial determinants of gasoline prices (e.g., spatial gasoline demand, distribution costs of gasoline, land prices, and Bertrand competition). Another reason for the results of this paper being di¤erent compared to the existing literature is due to having a nationwide gasoline price data within the U.S. for a long enough period of time, whereas existing studies (at the gas station level)
for the U.S. have mostly focused on local markets with only a couple of cities involved in the spatial analysis. As discussed in more details in the text, having such a local-level analysis would suppress the main determinants of gasoline prices, such as re…nery e¤ects, because many gas stations within the same location would already face similar local input costs. In contrast, employing a nationwide spatial analysis in this paper has allowed for comparisons across locations, which have resulted in depicting the high contribution of re…nery …xed e¤ects (among others, as discussed, above) to the spatial gasoline-price dispersion.
The model has explained more than 90% of the gasoline price dispersion (when we ignore the contribution of markups through Bertrand competition) at the gas-station level across time and space during the sample period. In a secondary analysis, the remaining 10% is explained by markups through
Bertrand competition under the case of spatially-varying elasticity of substitution between gasoline and other goods. Moreover, our welfare analysis depicts that there are signi…cant redistributive welfare e¤ects of spatially distributed gasoline prices.
Our analysis is not without caveats. For example, we have estimated the reduced-form equations implied by the model; although it may seem like a restrictive approach, such an approach was very simple and useful in terms of decomposing the contribution of many input costs, together with markups, to the gasoline price dispersion across gas-stations. Together with the spatial model, such an empirical approach also helped us investigating the welfare implications across spatially distributed individuals.
Another caveat is that we have mostly focused on the spatial (rather than a time series or a "full" panel) dimension of gasoline price determination due to the unbalanced panel nature of the gasoline price data, and we have not considered any dynamics, such as spatial variables interacting with time …xed e¤ects in the regression analysis; considering such interactions through appropriate modeling for unbalanced panels would result in richer dynamics, although they were not the focus of this paper. Notes: Elasticity of Substitution between Gas Stations is unique for each spatial measure. Elasticity of Substitution between Gasoline and Other Goods is available across time and space, but only the summary of the distribution has been depicted for each spatial measure. Notes: Robustness of Nighttime Lights is measured by the correlation coefficient between nighttime lights data and model-implied economic activity.
Figure 1 -Location of Gas Stations and Refiners
Notes: Gas stations are represented by blue small dots, and refiners are represented by red large squares. There are four Canadian refiners in the northeast of the map; these are the closest refiners to some gas stations (in our sample) in Northeastern United States. 
